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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Legislative Choice and Judicial Review
Rex E.Lee*
The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Employment
Division v. Smith1 has generated a signifcant volume of
This is not surprising considering the
scholarly ~riticism.~
fundamental change it worked on our understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause. Prior t o Smith the prevailing view was
that the Free Exercise Clause required the government to show
a compelling state interest to justify an intrusion on religious
f r e e d ~ mBut
. ~ in Smith, the Court held that so long as the law
is generally applicable-in other words, not aimed specifically
at religion-government may regulate religious activity so long
as the governmental interest is legitimate.'
In response to Smith, members of Congress proposed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.5 Now in its third attempt,
*

President, Brigham Young University; George Sutherland Professor of Law,

J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; Former Solicitor General
of the United States (1981-85); Former Assistant United States Attorney General,
Civil Division (1975-77). This article was adapted from a speech originally given at
a Bill of Rights symposium jointly sponsored by the Brigham Young University
Law School Alumni Association and the J. Reuben Clark Law Society.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
For a listing of some of the scholarly criticisms of Smith, see James E.
2.
Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment,
78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 n.15 (1992); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 60 (1992) (statement of Oliver S. Thomas, app. IV).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-97 (O'Co~or,J., concurring in the judgment); see
3.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406-07 (1963).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
4.
5.
H.R. 5377 & S. 3254, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Neither version of the
original bill passed the lOlst Congress. The bill was subsequently reintroduced as
H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2969, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), and
met a similar fate. The bill has again been reintroduced in both the House and
the Senate. H.R. 1308 & S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill passed the
House on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG.REC. H2356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993), and
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the Act stands a n excellent chance of passing, given its growing
~
potential interaction between the
bipartisan ~ u p p o r t .The
language of the Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Smith,
however, represents one of the most interesting and important
dynamics currently at work in American constitutional law.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act would require states to
provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws
unless doing so would defeat a compelling state interest. Quite
simply, the Act proposes to mandate religious accommodation
t h a t t h e Supreme Court has determined to be not
constitutionally required.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act should be adopted.
It would certainly represent an improvement over the present
state of the law, but it raises questions concerning the scope of
the legislative power. This article explores the interaction
between the Supreme Court's power of judicial review and the
Congress's law-making authority i n the context of the postincorporation Free Exercise Clause.
BETWEENJUDICIAL
REVIEWAND
11. THEINTERACTION
LEGISLAW POLICY
MAKING
Those who wrote the Constitution clearly intended the
judiciary to be the final interpreter of all laws, including the
Constitution. The best historical insight into those views is
contained in The Federalist No. 78, in which Alexander
Hamilton wrote:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the
constitutional judges of their own powers and that the
construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other
departments it may be answered that this cannot be the
natural presumption. . . . I t is far more rational to suppose
that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and
peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and

it was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of
15 to 1, 139 CONG.REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress
May 10, 1993, at A9.
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts,N.Y. TIMES,
6. See 139 CONG.REC. S2822 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy); id. at 52823 (letter from Pres. Clinton); id. at S2824 (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
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must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. I t
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning a s well a s
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body.'

No historical argument of equal dignity looks the other way.
Even the Anti-Federalists, though opposed to the concept of
judicial review, recognized that the Constitution provided for
its exercise by the ~ o u r t s . ~
As a policy matter, it makes eminently good sense that the
judiciary should be the ultimate guardian of constitutional
rights and declarant of their meaning. Constitutional rights
are, by their nature, minority right^.^ The principal role of the
Constitution, in this sense, is to protect these rights by limiting
the acts of the two political branches, which by definition
represent the majority. Precisely because these branches are
political, and thus responsive to the majority, it is appropriate
that the constitutional review of laws and other rules governing
our society that emanate from the political branches should
come from the judiciary-the only branch of government not
directly answerable to the majority.
The great risk inherent in this arrangement is, of course,
that under the guise of interpretation, the judiciary will engage
in a great deal of policy making. The potential for such
mischief is exacerbated by the reality that the most important
provisions of the United States Constitution, as well as the
majority of the statutes reviewed by the Court, are broadly
phrased and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the exercise of the very
proper judicial prerogative to interpret the law, and
particularly to determine its constitutionality, necessarily
involves a substantial amount of law making-especially since
law making is, in the final analysis, a choice among policy
alternatives. I will explain why this is true.

7.
THE FEDERAUST
NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton's statement is supported by several statements made during the
constitutional convention explicitly or implicitly recognizing the power of judicial
review. See JAMES
MADISON, NOTESOF DEBATES
IN THE FEDERALCONVENTION
OF
1787, at 61, 305, 351, 518, 539 (Norton ed. 1987) (1840).
8. The Anti-Federalist position was not that Hamilton was wrong about the
judiciary's role under the new Constitution, but that judicial review was not a good
J. STORING,
THE
idea. See, e.g., Essays of Brutus XI-XV, reprinted in 2 HERBERT
COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST
417-42 (Murray Dry ed. 1981).
The term "minority rights" in this context refers not specifically to ethnic or
9.
racial minorities, but to any political minority.
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Challenges to governmental acts are usually brought by
individuals who contend that a particular statute or regulation
violates their constitutional rights. Accordingly, judicial review
is customarily thought t o be a process of balancing two
competing sets of interests: those of the government and those
of the individual. The judicial task, it follows, is to determine
whether the individual interest is constitutionally protected,
thus requiring the governmental interest t o yield.
This view is deficient because it overlooks one important
feature of the overall governmental process. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, the governmental interest that
conflicts with the individual interest involves nothing more nor
less than a legislative preference of one private, individual
interest over another. Consider, for example, Williamson v. Lee
Optical,l0 in which a group of opticians challenged an
Oklahoma statute that restricted the rendering of certain eyecare services t o licensed ophthalmologists and optometrists.
Under the traditional view, Williamson would be characterized
as a case involving a conflict between the state's interest in
ensuring high quality eye care and the individual interest of
opticians in being allowed t o perform the restricted eye-care
services. But this is not an accurate characterization. The
public policy reflected in the Oklahoma statute represented no
more than a legislative decision that the public interest is
better served by preferring the interests of one private group,
the more highly trained ophthalmologists and optometrists,
over those of another, the opticians. The imprimatur of state
interest was not attached until after the legislature, as
required by o u r system of government, weighed the competing
private interests and made a decision. It was only then that
one of the competing private interests became governmental.
As the Court explained, "The Oklahoma law may exact a
needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
d i s a d v a n t a g e s of t h e new requirement."" Line
drawingdeciding which of two competing interests better
serves the public interest-is the essence of law making. It is
what legislatures do best; it is what they are institutionally
and structurally capable of doing better than any other branch
of government.
10.
11.

348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Id. at 487.
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In Williamson, the Court left the legislative judgment
it did not. Instead, the
intact. In Zablocki u. ~ e d h a i l ' ~
Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that required
persons with existing child support obligations to demonstrate
their ability to meet those obligations before they could
marry.13 Under the traditional view, judicial review of this
statute would be described as a balance of two competing sets
of interests: the government's interest in assuring that children
are cared for, and the private interest of those who want t o
marry.
Once again the traditional view is wrong. And it is wrong
in ways that affect our thinking about the respective roles of
legislatures and courts. In our system, government has no
internal self-interest; it exists t o serve the needs of the
people.14 The traditional view is wrong because it considers
the competing sets of interests only at the stage where they
come into court, after the government, in the form of the
legislature, has already considered those interests and made a
choice between them. But at the very first stage, in Zablocki as
in Williamson and most cases, the choice made by the
legislature is a choice between two sets of competing private
interests. The reason that the competing interests can be
neatly classified as governmental or individual at the judicial
stage is that the legislature has already addressed the issues,
made its choice, and placed the imprimatur of public interest
on one side of the controversy.
In Zablocki, one of the private interests was the interest in
marrying-in pursuing one's life as a member of a traditional
family unit. The group of individuals who share that interest
are adults-parents and prospective marriage partners. The
competing interests are those of children in assuring that their
basic needs for survival and sustenance will not be disregarded
by those who brought them into the world. It is simply wrong,
therefore, t o say that the competing interests in Zablocki were
those of the State of Wisconsin on the one hand and those of

12. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
13. Id. at 375, 388-91.
14. The preamble to the United States Constitution provides that the purpose
of government is to "form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty." U.S. CONST.pmbl. The purpose of state
governments is basically the same. See, e.g., UTAH CONST.art. I, $9 1-2; VA.
CONST.art. I, $ 3; WASH.
CONST.art. I, $ 1.
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individuals like Mr. Redhail on the other. At the legislative
stage both interests were individual interests. When the
legislature made its choice, the individual nature of the
preferred interest did not disappear.
The only accurate way to describe the task facing the
judiciary, therefore, is that it involves an accommodation
between two groups of individuals, one of whom the legislature
has already decided has the best side of the argument.
Obviously, this does not mean that legislative policy choices
should never be disturbed by the courts. Judicial review is just
as much a cornerstone of our separation of powers, and indeed
our total constitutional structure, as is the legislative policymaking prerogative. The solution lies in reaching an
accommodation between the two branches and the inherent
overlap between their two core functions: policy making by the
legislature, and constitutional law making by the judiciary,
which inevitably involves overturning at least some of the
legislature's policy judgments.
111. STANDARDS
FOR JUDICIAL
VIEW
The proper approach to judicial review must begin with an
attitude of deference toward the legislature and a consequent
reluctance to rule against constitutionality. This general view
is motivated in part by basic feelings about democracy, and in
part by theoretical and practical considerations of what the
relationship should be between coordinate branches of
government, including whether the residual power to make law
ought to reside in the legislature or in the co~rts.'~
This deferential standard of review, which is followed in
15. The legislature is, after all, a coordinate branch of government with
independent authority to interpret the Constitution within its own sphere of
responsibility. The fad that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), does not mean that Congress must take a subservient
position to the Court. As Professor Wechsler has reminded us:
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on
constitutional questions because there is a special function vested in them
to enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of government.
They do so rather for the reason that they must decide a litigated issue
that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing so must give effect
to the supreme law of the land. That is, at least, what Marbury v.
Madison was all about.
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM.L. REV. 1001, 1006
(1965) (footnote omitted).
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the majority of cases, is usually called rational basis review.
Like other standards employed by the Court, it has two
principal, and related focal points. The first concerns the
importance of the governmental interest that must be shown,
and the second, the degree of likelihood that the statute a t
issue will in fact achieve that governmental objective. In its
traditional applications, the rational basis approach favors the
government on both of these inquiries: the governmental
interest is acceptable so long as it falls within the legitimate
scope of government's power to act, ahd the "fit" between
means and end will be found acceptable so long as there is a
reasonable possibility that what government has done will in
fact achieve its legitimate objective? Not surprisingly, in the
great majority of cases in which the rational basis test is
applied, the government emerges victorious.
Over the course of our history, considerable attention has
focused on the question of which categories of cases ought to
qualify for an exception t o the rational basis approach. The
Constitution says nothing explicitly about categories of
"preferred" rights entitled t o higher levels of scrutiny, and over
the years the courts have struggled with the question of
whether there should be such preferred, heightened scrutiny
categories, and if so, what they should be.
In my view, the strongest candidates for preferred,
fundamental right status are those rights that quite clearly,
either from the constitutional text or its history, were the
central concern underlying the adoption of a particular
provision. Obvious examples include (1)the First Amendment's
freedom from prior restraints, (2) the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition of state-sponsored racial discrimination, and (3) the
Commerce Clause's guarantee that a state may not prefer its
own economic interests over those of another state. In fact,
however, preferred status has been extended far beyond these
concerns or even those rights explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution's text, to the point that it is impossible to draw a
rational dividing line between rights that are afforded a
preferred status and rights that are not. Indeed, many rights
declared fundamental by the Supreme Court are not even
mentioned in the Constitution.
16. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See
generally GERALDGUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 608-12 (12th ed. 1991)
(discussing rational basis scrutiny).
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Starting about a hundred years ago, with Lochner u. New
York," and continuing for the next four decades, the cases on
which the constitutional searchlight consistently shone most
brightly were those in which the government deprived
individuals and corporations of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. The Court's concern was not with
procedural defects in the regulations, but rather with their
substan~e.'~
In most cases, these were economic regulation
cases, but in at least two famous instances, Meyer u.
~ e b r a s k a ' and
~ Pierce u. Society of Sisters:' non-economic
rights were involved. This so-called Lochner era of substantive
due process came to an end with Nebbia u. New York2' and
West Coast Hotel u. Parrish?' not because the Supreme Court
declared that the Due Process Clause had no substantive
component, but simply because the Court changed the standard
of review from heightened scrutiny to a highly deferential
application of rational basis
Over the decades since that time, beginning as early as
1942 with Skinner u. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson? and
reaching full flower within the last three decades, the Court
has now rather firmly established that it will afford heightened
or strid scrutiny where the law under review either contains a
suspect classification or impacts a fundamental right.25
The standard for reviewing these cases provides an
interesting comparison to the rational basis test. Both tests
inquire into the strength of the governmental interest and the
17.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1915); Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908).
19. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state law prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages in the schools).
20.
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating state law requiring students to attend
public schools).
21.
291 US. 502 (1934).
22.
300 US. 379 (1937).
23.
Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525 (holding that legislation need only bear a
substantial relationship to its underlying purpose); West Coast, 300 U.S. at 391
(holding that a regulation is constitutional if it is reasonably related to a
community interest). Later cases were even more deferential. See Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963) (rational basis); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955) (same).
24.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
25.
See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1969) (suspect class);
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-56 (1973) (fundamental rights); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964)
(same).
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tightness of the fit between means and end. But where a
suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved, the
requirements for both components of the test are considerably
more stringent. The governmental interest must be compelling,
not merely legitimate and reasonable, and the statute must be
narrowly tailored or necessary to achieve the relevant
compelling state intere~t.'~The mere possibility, or even
probability, that the law will in fact achieve its objective is not
sufficient. This second requirement, dealing with the meansend relationship applicable to fundamental rights cases, is
sometimes expressed another way-that
government must
employ the least burdensome alternative." This is not
identical to the "narrowly tailored" requirement; it is even more
restrictive, because in essence what it says is that the chosen
governmental means is unconstitutional so long as there is
some other less burdensome way that government could have
achieved the same resukZ8
To be sure, this brief summary is somewhat oversimplified.
On the rational basis end, the courts have sometimes found
ways to apply what some have referred to as rational basis
"with bite"29 either by requiring a tighter fit between means
or -by ascribing a n improper motive to the
and end:'
legi~lature.~'
And a t the other end, the Court has sometimes
shown a proclivity to find some governmental objectives to be
compelling." But whatever give there may be at either end on
either of these two tests, there is little doubt that i n theory,
and almost always in practice, they are poles apart.
The critical questions then are (1) Which rights are

26.
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). See generally GUNTHER,
supm note 16, at 642 n.2 (discussing the various verbal formulations of strict
scrutiny).
27.
DUM V. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488-90 (1960).
28.
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989).
29.
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-37 (1972); see also GUNTHER,
supra note 16, at 449 & n.9.
30.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-53 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
31. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342-45 (1960).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982) (social security);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971) (military conscription);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-19 (1944) (prevention of espionage
and sabotage).
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included within the class of rights determined t o be
fundamental? and (2) Which bases for classification are
considered to be suspect? These questions are important
because not only do the answers determine the intensity of the
constitutional review, but in most cases they determine the
substantive outcome as well. Unfortunately, the Court's
answers have been far from satisfactory.
With regard to the first question, in at least one case, Sun
Antonio Independent School District v. R o d r i g u e ~ , the
~~
Supreme Court has said that fundamental rights are those
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The
problem with this statement is that it does not, in fact, describe
what the Supreme Court has done.34 As the dissent in
Rodriguez points out so persuasively, several rights
traditionally held to be fundamental-the right to vote in state
elections,35the right to marry and procreateP6 and the right
to appeal a criminal conviction3'-are neither explicitly nor
implicitly guaranteed by the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~
Additional
~
examples of so-called implied fundamental rights include the
right to travePgand the right of privacy.40
The second question, concerning which classifications
qualify as suspect, has not been addressed in a consistent
fashion." The Court has consistently held that classifications
411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
33.
In at least one scholar's view, the Rodriguez dichotomy between textual and
34.
nontextual rights is no longer followed by the Court. Dennis J. Hutchinson, More
Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 167,
192 (Subsequent cases "demonstrate that Rodriguez is now a constitutional relic.").
But see GEOFFREY
R. STONE
AL., C O N S T ~ I O NLAW
A L 900 (2d ed. 1991) ("Since
1973 the Court has generally adhered to the Rodriguez reformulation.").
Interestingly, both Hutchinson and Stone are members of the same law faculty.
35.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Yick Wo v.
Hopbins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also
36.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978).
37.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956).
38. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. a t 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618, 629-31 (1969).
40.
Griswold v. Co~ecticut,381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). After the Court's recent decision in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), it is unclear whether the right of privacy, at least
in the context of abortion, has retained its fundamental status. Id. at 2804-08; id
at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
41.
The Court's decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938), though ostensibly a decision cutting back on the number of cases
qualifying for heightened scrutiny, left a loophole that has become the basis of
much of the modern suspect classification debate. In his famous footnote four,
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based on race are inherently suspect and thus must be strictly
~crutinized.~~
Beyond race, however, only three classifications
have attracted any degree of heightened s~rutiny-gender,4~
alienage or national
and illegitima~y.~~
However,
none of these classifications currently evoke strict scrutiny
across the
and attempts to attract heightened
scrutiny to classifxations based on age:' mental deficiencyf
and poverty4' have failed. Thus, the only clear answer to this
question is that government may not draw distinctions based
on race unless it can demonstrate that the distinction is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Not
surprisingly, this is a very Micult, if not impossible, task.

Justice Stone stated,
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation . . . .
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court has been grappling
with the answer to this question ever since.
42.
E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 US. 214, 216 (1944); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880).
43.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69-72 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (plurality opinion).
44.
Compare Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) ("[C]lassifications
based on alienage are 'subject to close judicial scrutiny.'") and Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (same) with Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 72-75 (1979) ("[Ebrclusion of aliens from [certain] governmental positions would
not invite as demanding scrutiny.") and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294-97
(1978) (same).
45.
Illegitimacy has never formally been labeled a suspect classification,
GUNTHER,supra note 16, at 688, however classifications based on illegitimacy have
attracted varying degrees of heightened scrutiny. E.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S.
1, 7-11 (1983); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
46.
See supra notes 4345; GUNTHER,supra note 16, a t 636-93.
47.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976).
48.
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1981).
49.
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 14142 (1971).
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IV. FREEEXERCISE
AND Employment Division v. Smith
The individual guarantees contained in the First
Amendment, including the free exercise of religion, were among
the first to be afforded fundamental right status.50
This is as it should be if heightened scrutiny is to be
extended to any guarantees beyond those that were, as
discussed above,51quite clearly the central concern underlying
the adoption of a particular constitutional provision. As a
textual guarantee, the fkee exercise of religion has a strong
claim on heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, it had been the law,
a t least since Sherbert v. V e r n e ~ =that
, ~ ~ the only
constitutionally acceptable laws that inhibit the free exercise of
religion are those that are narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.
The most striking example of the potency of this rule in
the Free Exercise Clause context is found in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,s3 a case in which the Court held unconstitutional as
applied t o members of the Amish faith a Wisconsin statute
requiring all children to attend school up t o the age of sixteen.
The legitimacy of the State's interest in assuring a minimally
educated citizenry was obvious and conceded, as was the
rationality of the relationship between the law at issue and the
achievement of that objective. Clearly, the law would pass
rational basis scrutiny with flying colors. But regardless of the
strength of the governmental interest, and even assuming
arguendo that it was compelling (which the Court did not), the
State of Wisconsin had access to other, less burdensome means
to achieve its objective. Accordingly, the statute failed the
second half of the compelling state interest test. The fit
ly
between means and end was not ~ ~ c i e n ttight.
Despite the apparently established fundamental status of
the free exercise right, the compelling interest test was

50.
See Cantwell v. Co~ecticut,310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental
concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25
(1937) ("[I]mmunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of
the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become
valid as against the states." (footnote omitted)).
See supra p. 79.
51.
374 U.S.398, 406-07 (1963).
52.
406 U.S.205, 234 (1972).
53.
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abandoned in Employment Division v. SmithF4 which may be
the most important free exercise case to be decided since
Reynolds v. United States.55 Alfred Smith and his companion
Galen Black were fired from their jobs as drug counselors
because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes
pursuant to their beliefs as members of the Native American
The Supreme Court ruled that the denial of their
claims for unemployment compensation did not offend the Free
Exercise Clause. But that fact is not what put the opinion into
the case books and the law reviews. As Justice O'Comor states
in her concurrence, the Court could have easily affirmed the
Oregon Supreme Court under the traditional compelling state
interest standard, given the strength of the state's interest in
controlling the use of drugs.57 Instead, the majority stunned
nearly every student of constitutional law by announcing a
quite different approach to the adjudication of free exercise
cases: So long as the state's laws are generally applicable, so
that religious practices are not singled out, they are not
rendered unconstitutional because they idkinge on religious
belief or pra~tice.~'

54.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
55.
98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that general prohibition of polygamy did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause).
56. Just offhand, one would say that this is something drug counselors should
not do.
57.
Smith,494 U.S. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If, however, the state's
interest is defined more narrowly as the interest in refusing to make an exception
for the religious use of peyote, this argument becomes problematic because Oregon
was not enforcing its drug laws with respect to the religious use of peyote at the
time. Id. at 909-11 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
58.
Id. at 878. According to Justice Scalia,
It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for
example, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by those citizens
who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to
regard the same tax as "abridging the freedom . . . of the press" of those
publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in
business.
Id. This analogy is reminiscent of a rather cramped Hamiltonian view of the Bill
of Rights. Hamilton, who opposed the Bill of Rights, contended that it could add
no protections beyond those provided by the limited nature of the proposed federal
NO. 84, at 512-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
government. THE FEDERALIST
Rossiter ed., 1961). His thesis, that the limited government had no authority to act
beyond its enumerated powers, led him to ask rhetorically, "Wlhy declare that
things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should
it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is
given by which restrictions may be imposed?" Id. at 513-14. Hamilton's argument
is based on a conception of a First Amendment that would protect individual
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In all fairness, the Smith decision was not completely
without precedent. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the Court has
not always been completely consistent, even before Smith, in
requiring that the laws be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest in religion cases.59 The case which
irrefutably proves his point is Goldman v. Weinberger,60which
rejected the claim of a n Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer that
the Free Exercise Clause gave him a constitutional right to
wear a yarmulke as part of his military attire, notwithstanding
military regulations to the contrary.
The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, determined ipse dixit
that "review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
~ociety."~'In other words, the compelling interest test did not
apply. Exactly why such deference to the military was required
in that case is unclear. About the strongest argument that can
be made in support of the regulation is that it promotes the
military's interest in uniformity of appearance. Although
acceptable reasons exist for the military to want to have all of
its officers look alike, it can certainly carry out its task of
defending our shores while still permitting yarmulkes in the
cockpit. To say that there is no less burdensome alternative
would be nothing less than laughable.
If the Smith approach survives, it will work some very
large changes in existing free exercise jurisprudence. The

liberties only against purposeful infringement, not against generally applicable
legislation. Although Hamilton's conception of the Bill of Rights may have been
acceptable in 1786, when the federal powers were construed narrowly, it is almost
unthinkable in a modern society in which nearly every facet of life is subject to
governmental regulation. It is also worth remembering that Hamilton's argument
concerning the Bill of Rights was not persuasive even in his day.
59. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-90. The scorecard does not suggest that free
exercise plaintiffs have done very well, even under the compelling state interest
test. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 1416-17,1458-59 (In the Supreme Court, free
exercise claims have lost in 13 out of 17 cases and in the circuit courts they have
lost in 85 out of 97 cases.). Even so, the danger of Smith is that legislatures will
no longer feel a need to provide religious exemptions that, though no longer
required, are permissible. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987).
60. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). Other cases where the Court failed to apply the
compelling state interest test include Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342
(1987);Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
61. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
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reason, quite simply, is that few laws that in fact inhibit the
free exercise of religion are s p e ~ ~ c a l laimed
y
at religious
practices. Certainly the South Carolina unemployment
compensation laws involved in Sherbert or Wisconsin's
compulsory education requirement in Yoder were not aimed at
religious groups or religious practices. Both were quintessential
general laws, generally applied. But as then Chief Justice
Burger stated in Yoder, there are
areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to
control, even under regulations of general applicability . . . .
. . . A regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion?

It is quite clear, therefore, that the Smith test applied to the
facts of either Sherbert or Yoder would have required a
different result than that obtained in either of those cases.
In an attempt to distinguish Yoder and other similar cases
in which the compelling interest test had been applied, Justice
Scalia noted that each case involved a hybrid of constitutional
rights, a free exercise right combined with another
constitutionally protected right which subjected the claim t o
heightened scrutiny. This so-called hamburger-helper theory of
constitutional laws3 is not an accurate description of those
cases. Although each distinguished case did implicate another
right afforded protection by the Court, a reading of Yoder and
the other cases demonstrates that the free exercise right did
not play second chair to the other right. In Yoder for example,
the plus factor was the right of parents to direct the education
of their children. Although the Court noted that "when the
interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim
of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a
'reasonable relation t o some purpose within the competency of
the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's
requirement under the First Amendment,'* the opinion also

62.
Yoder, 406 US. at 220, quoted in Smith, 494 US. at 896 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
63.
James D. Gordon 111, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV.91,
98 11.49 (1991).
64.
Yoder, 406 US. at 233.
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concluded that the Free Exercise Clause (by itself) often
requires exemptions to generally applicable law?
Many of the concerns implicated in Free Exercise Clause
cases may also be addressed by other constitutional
guarantees, such as equal protection or free speech, but it does
not follow that this overlap somehow relegates the Free
Exercise Clause to a secondary status. Especially puzzling is
the implication that the free exercise of religion, a textual
right, needed t o be combined with the right of parents to direct
the education of their children, a nontextual, substantive due
process right,B6 in order to attract strict scrutiny?' The first
freedom of the First Amendment is the free exercise of religion,
and nothing in the text, history, or previous judicial
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause suggests that this
freedom must depend upon some other constitutional guarantee
for protection.
The attempted distinction of Sherbert is similarly
unsatisfactory. Justice Scalia pointed out that recently the
compelling state interest test had been applied only in
unemployment compensation cases such as Sherbert. That does
not provide ground for distinction because Smith, like Sherbert,
was an unemployment compensation case.
On June 11, 1993, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. u. City of Hialeah," the Supreme Court reaffirmed by
dictum the basic rules of law laid down by the Smith case,
though it held, on quite narrow grounds, that the church and
its individual practitioners involved in that particular case
were entitled t o free exercise protection. At issue was the
constitutionality of ordinances enacted by the city of Hialeah
prohibiting ritual animal s a ~ r i f i c e . ~ ~
The ordinances on their face did not single out any
particular sect or group. The Court held, however, that despite
their facial neutrality, the record in the case revealed the
65.
See supra text accompanying note 61.
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
66.
534-35 (1925).
At least one lower court has interpreted the hybrid-right theory to mean
67.
that the combination of two constitutional rights should trigger no greater scrutiny
than would each right standing on its own. Salvation Army v. Department of
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 1990). In other words, the
combination of free exercise and freedom of association would protect association
for religious purposes only against purposeful discrimination. Id.
113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
68.
See Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987).
69.
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ordinances to have been directly aimed a t the practices of a
particular sect known as Santeria,7o whose membership
consists principally of Caribbean immigrants to the United
States and whose religious ceremonies include the ritual
sacrifice of small animals, such as chickens, squirrels and cats.
"Facial neutrality is not determinative," the Court said,71and
"[tlhe Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause,
extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause 'forbids subtle
departures from neutrality . . . .' "12 And though the city put
forth legitimate governmental objectives on which the
ordinances could be based, there were other means by which
these objectives could have been achieved.73
Because the Lukumi case was decided on religious
neutrality grounds,74 statements in the various opinions
concerning the continuing validity of Smith are necessarily
dicta. Nevertheless, it is fairly apparent that the 5-4 majority,
which in 1990 rejected the compelling state interest test in free
exercise cases involving statutes of general applicability, is now
a 6-3 majority. Two of the four original dissenters, Justices
Brennan and Marshall, have retired. Of their two
replacements, one agrees with Smith and one does not. Justice
Souter, concurring in the judgment in Lukumi, is of the view
that "the distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately
~ntenable."'~And Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion,
which asserts that, "In addressing the constitutional protection
for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general
proposition that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect
of burdening a particular religious practice."76 Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, adhere to
the position "that Smith was wrongly decided, because it
ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative
individual liberty and treated the Free Exercise Clause as no

70.
See Petitioners' Brief passim, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (No. 91-948).
Id. at 2227.
71.
72. Id. (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
Id. at 2229-30.
73.
74.
The Court also found the ordinances overbroad and underinclusive. Id. at
2232-34.
Id. at 2244 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
75.
Id. at 2226 (citing Smith).
76.

.
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more than an antidiscrimination principle."77
Thus, though all the statements are dicta, those
statements leave little doubt that the Smith test now enjoys
better health than it did three years ago, and the need for
prompt passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
correspondingly "compelling."

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was
introduced in response to Smith, leaves little doubt about what
it attempts to do. Section three provides:
(a) Government shall not burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a, rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Government may burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."

This is about as clear a statement of the compelling state
interest test as can be found anywhere, and it creates a very
interesting tension. On the one hand, the Supreme Court of the
United States has interpreted the First Amendment to require
only a fairly deferential standard of review whenever the law
at issue is religiously neutral because it is generally applicable
in both religious and non-religious contexts. Then, rather
patently, Congress proposes a very different standard of review,
and therefore a very different rule of constitutional law. Can
the Congress of the United States simply lay down a
completely different rule of constitutional law, and if so, has
the core function of a coordinate branch of government been
completely eviscerated?
The source of authority for the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which gives Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."7g The exact
77.

Id. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).

78.
79.

S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
U.S. CONST. amend. X I V , 8 5. Each of the other Reconstruction
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parameters of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Section Five
powers constitute one of the most complex and vexing areas of
constitutional law, and one that quite clearly is yet to be
resolved. The endpoints of that doctrine are fairly well fixed.
On the one hand, Section Five does not create in Congress the
blanket authority to overrule any constitutional decision by the
Supreme Court, thereby effectively overruling Marbury v.
Madison. But on the other hand, neither is it devoid of any
meaning. At a minimum, it authorizes Congress to enact what
the Court has sometimes referred to as "remedial" legislation,
which effectively builds upon and strengthens already existing
constitutional rights.80 About the only matter on which one
can be confident in this regard is that if the bill becomes law,
there will be a challenge to its constitutionality.
The scope of the Section Five power was articulated over
100 years ago in Ex parte Virginia:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends
to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to
secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State
denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the
domain of congressional power.81

This language substantially mirrors Chief Justice
Marshall's description of the Necessary and Proper Clauses2
in McCulloch v. M a r y l ~ n d"Let
. ~ ~ the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which

Amendments, Thirteen and Fifteen, has an identical enforcement clause. See id.
amend. XIII, 5 2; id. amend. XV, 5 2.
Other possible sources of authority include the Commerce Clause, id. art. I,
5 8, cl. 3, and, if redrafkd, the General Welfare Clause, id. cl. 1, but Congress has
not chosen to use these powers. If it had been utilized, the Commerce Clause
would have been a possibility because many generally applicable laws infringing on
the free exercise of religion affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. a t
874 (employment compensation). Congress might also make the receipt of certain
federal funds contingent upon the granting of religious exemptions from generally
applicable law. Cf. The Equal Access Ad, 20 U.S.C. 5 4071 (1988) (requiring high
schools receiving federal funds to allow religiously oriented student groups equal
access to school facilities).
Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), with Lassiter
80.
v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880).
81.
U.S. CONST.art. I, 5 8, cl. 18.
82.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
83.
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are appropriate, which are plainly adapted t o that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." Chief Justice Marshall's
language was used by the Court in South Carolina u.
~ a t z e n b a c h as
~ ~ the test for determining the limit of
Congress's enforcement power under Section Two of the
Fifteenth Amend~nent?~
In that case the Court, under the upheld a suspension of literacy
Voting Rights Act of 1965,~~
testing in areas with less than fifty percent voter registration,
even though the Court had previously held, in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of ~lections,8'that literacy testing
did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment.88 Another example
of the breadth of the enforcement power is found in City of
Rome v. United States:' in which the Court, applying
McCulloch's appropriateness test, held that Congress could
legislate t o prohibit voting schemes with discriminatory effects
even though, according to City of Mobile v. Bolden:' decided
the same day, those schemes did not per se violate the
Fifteenth Amendment."
Both South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome
suggest, at least by implication, that the enforcement powers of
each of the reconstruction amendments are coe~tensive.~~
Since the language of each of the enforcement provisions is
identical, no reason exists to believe that this implication is
not, in fact, e~plicit.'~
In Katzenbach v. b organ:^ the Court decided a Voting
Rights Act case under the Equal Protection Clause of the

84.
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
85.
Id. at 326. This is entirely proper given that the Clause, by its text,
applies to "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States." U.S. CONST.art. I., $ 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
86.
42 U.S.C. $ 1973 (1988).
87.
360 U.S. 45 (1959).
88.
See Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional
Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1059-60 (1993).
89.
446 U.S.156 (1980).
90.
446 US. 55, 65-74 (1980).
91.
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177; see Pawa supra note 88, a t 1059-62.
92.
See City of Rome, 446 U.S. a t 176-77, 179-80; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 32627; Pawa, supra note 88, at 1059-62.
93.
City of Rome, 466 U.S. a t 207 n.1 @ehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe nature
of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
has always been treated as coextensive.").
94.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Fourteenth Amendment. The State of New York required
persons who had completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican
school to pass a literacy test in order to vote. The enforcement
of the testing requirement was prohibited by section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act. The Court found this to be a proper exercise
of the Section Five enforcement powers even though in Lassiter
it was determined that literacy tests are not necessarily
prohibited by the Fourteenth or Fifkeenth Amendments. The
Court held that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is
"a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."95
Justice Breman, writing for the Court, gave two
alternative rationales for section 4(e). The first, that Congress
may have intended to increase the political power of Puerto
R i c a n ~ ,does
~ ~ not seem outlandish. However, the second
rationale, that Congress may have determined on its own
accord that the New York literacy tests violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause:'
is truly remarkable,
in that, if carried to its extreme, it shakes the foundations of
the popular understanding of Marbury v. Madi~on.~'
This second rationale, qualified by the notion that Section
Five "does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion . . .
'to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this
Court,'"gg has become known popularly as the "ratchet
theory."100According to this theory, Congress may statutorily
require more, but not less, protection of a constitutional right
than the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, would itself
require. If that is in fact a correct statement of the law-a
proposition which is not settled-then the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act would fit within congressional authority. The
test for determining whether it is appropriate legislation to
enforce the Free Exercise Clause would be, in the language of
McCulloch v. Maryland, whether the legislation is "plainly
adapted to that end" and whether the Act is "not prohibited,
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652-53.
Id. at 652-54.
But see supra note 15.
Morgan, 384 U.S.at 651 n.10 (quoting id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
99.
100. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1230 (1978).
95.
96.
97.
98.
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but consist[s] with the letter and spirit of the constitution."101
The ratchet theory has never been expressly adopted by
the Court. In Morgan it was one of two alternative rationales.
However, it is fully consistent with the theory of constitutional
jurisprudence since McCulloch. That is, the Constitution gives
Congress broad powers to act within the scope of its broadly
interpreted enumerated powers.lo2 In addition, numerous
cases have reaffirmed Congress's authority to legislate beyond
the Court's interpretations t o enforce the Fourteenth
A~nendment.''~This power is equally broad when used to
enforce the incorporated Bill of Rights?
The enforcement power is not unlimited. It is subject t o
other express provisions of the Constitution,'" and it may
not be used as a pretext to legislate on matters unrelated t o
the Fourteenth Amendment.lo6 However, none of these
concerns appears to be implicated by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.''? The Constitution leaves no power
expressly to the states to regulate religion, and after
incorporation the Free Exercise Clause is directly related to the
Fourteenth Amendment.lo8

101.
17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
102. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111 (1942) (Commerce Clause).
103. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990); Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 US. 164, 186-88 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality opinion). See generally Douglas
Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221.
104. See Hutto v. F i ~ e y ,437 U.S. 678, 693-99 (1978). But see id. at 717-18
(Rehnqyist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's power to enforce the Bill of
Rights is not the same as its power to enforce the textual provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Pawa, supra note 88, at 1062-69.
105. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 124-31 (1970).
106. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
107. Paul Brest suggests another limitation on the Section Five power: "[Tlhe
Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress any greater power to contradict
judicial doctrine than Congress has under any other part of the Constitution." Paul
Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 69 (1986). This limitation should pose no difficulty to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Properly understood the Act does not
attempt to contradict Smith's interpretation of the First Amendment, instead it
provides a more effective enforcement mechanism for the free exercise of religion
than that which the Court was willing to provide. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Justice Scalia concludes his opinion in Smith by suggesting
that the Court is not the proper branch of government to draw the lines in this
area. Id. If the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is seen as a congressional
acceptance of the invitation to "be solicitous of [the free exercise] value in its
legislation," id., then no objection can be raised.
108. Laycock, supra note 103, at 95.
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The adoption of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
would represent a n improvement in the present state of the
law. Of all the rights that might qualify for preferred status,
free exercise of religion should head the list. Within the present
framework of constitutional law, the "generally applicable"
standard simply does not afford sufficient protection for
religious exercise, especially for smaller, politically powerless
religions. Justice Scalia's description of this fact as an
"unavoidable consequence of democratic govern~nent"'~~
is
incredible in the context of the fundamental nature of First
Amendment rights. Although many private interests are
sacrificed as a price of living i n a civilized society, the free
exercise of religion cannot be one of them. Free exercise has at
least as great a claim to the protection of heightened scrutiny
as any other right afforded such protection by the Court.
The ultimate irony of the Court's new approach to the Free
Exercise Clause is that, from a practical standpoint, racial
minorities, normally afforded protection from discrimination i n
the suspect classifkation cases, are the very ones that have
been denied the protection of the compelling state interest test
in this fundamental rights context. In many of the Court's free
exercise cases, even before Smith, the losing plaintiffs were
members of a racial or ethnic minority.'1° Almost all of them
are members of a religious minority-a potentially suspect
class according to United States v. Carolene Products Co.'"
Because larger religions are powerful enough to protect their
concerns through the political process, generally applicable
laws will rarely burden anything but the free exercise of
minority religions. The reality of the post-Smith Free Exercise
Clause may be that the compelling state interest test, still
applicable in cases of purposeful discrimination, governs except
in those cases where there is a suspect classification. From the
standpoint of constitutional policy, giving those within a
suspect class a lesser, rather than a greater, protection is the
ultimate perversion.

109. Smith, 494 U S . at 890.
110. See Smith, 494 US. at 874 (Native Americans); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (same); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Jews); see a h Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991);
supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
111. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The present state of free exercise jurisprudence is, to say
the least, confused and unsettled. It simply cannot remain in
its present state. Several possibilities exist for change. The
change could come from Congress, if it has the constitutional
authority. Or the Court itself could back away from Smith, and
reinstitute compelling state interest and narrow tailoring as
the governing standard. The Lukumi case suggests that this
possibility is not imminent. A third possibility is that Smith,
with its "anything-goes-so-long-as-the-laws-are-generallyapplicable" standard, could become the governing law not only
in free exercise cases, but all across the First Amendment
spectr~m."~
A fourth possibility-though unfortunately not a
likely one-is that the Court will recognize the wisdom of my
own preferred view and establish deference to the political
branches as the standard in all contexts except where it can be
shown that the protection of a specific individual right was the
motivating force behind the adoption of a particular provision
of the constitution. The final possibility is that the end of the
world will come. When that happens, all laws should be
generally applicable.

See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-67 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (applying Smith's "generally applicable law"
112.

standard 'in the context of free expression).

